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NOT TOO LITTLE,
BUT A LITTLE TOO LATE:
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S REFUSAL TO
CONSIDER NEW ISSUES RAISED BY
SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY
Christopher R. Prior∗
“Orderly rules of procedure do not require sacrifice of
the rules of fundamental justice.”1
INTRODUCTION
Rule 28(j) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
provide that “[i]f pertinent and significant authorities come to a
party’s attention after the party’s brief has been filed—or after
oral argument but before decision—a party may promptly advise
the circuit clerk by letter, with a copy to all other parties,
setting forth the citations.”2 The Rules go on to say that “[t]he
letter must state the reasons for the supplemental citations,
referring either to the page of the brief or to a point argued
orally.”3 While Rule 28(j) provides for the consideration of new

∗

Brooklyn Law School Class of 2007; B.A., Queens College, City
University of New York, 1999. The author would like to thank his family for
their love and support. The author would also like to thank the staff of the
Journal of Law and Policy, particularly Mark Sattinger. The author wishes to
thank Professor Ursula Bentele for her assistance with numerous drafts of this
Note. Finally, the author would like to thank John Miras, John Mattoon and
Virginia Nimick.
1
Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941).
2
FED. R. APP. P. 28(j).
3
Id.
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authority, the general rule4 is that appellate courts are under no
obligation to consider arguments that were not previously raised,
either at the trial level or in the appellate brief.5 This general
rule stems from English common law6 and is said to protect the
interests of adverse appellate parties7 and to conserve judicial
resources.8 However, there is no clear answer or direction when
Rule 28(j) and the general rule conflict, and a party attempts to
raise a potentially dispositive issue based on newly issued
authority.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has dealt with several
such conflicts, and has consistently declined to consider
arguments based on authority not cited in a party’s original
appellate brief. In one recent case, United States v. Bordon,9 a
concurring judge noted that the Eleventh Circuit differs from
other Circuit Courts of Appeal in its rejection of relevant
authority decided after appellants have handed in their briefs.10
In Bordon, the Eleventh Circuit declined to hear an appeal of a
criminal sentence based on a recent United States Supreme
Court decision.11 The Bordon decision mirrored the Eleventh
4

Robert J. Martineau, Considering New Issues on Appeal: The General
Rule and the Gorilla Rule, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1023, 1024 (1987). The
“general rule” is that new issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
See id. at 1024-26.
5
Sarah M.R. Cravens, Involved Appellate Judging, 88 MARQ. L. REV.
251, 251 (2004).
6
See Martineau, supra note 4, at 1026; Rhett R. Dennerline, Pushing
Aside the General Rule in Order to Raise New Issues on Appeal, 64 IND. L.J.
985, 985-86 (1989).
7
See Dennerline, supra note 6, at 987-88.
8
Martineau, supra note 4, at 1032.
9
421 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2005).
10
Id. at 1208 (Hill, J., concurring). Hill concurred only on the doctrine
of stare decisis. Id. at 1208-09.
11
Id. at 1206 n.1. The court declined to hear the Bordons’ argument
based on United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). In Booker, the
Supreme Court found that the federal sentencing guidelines were
unconstitutional to the extent that they allow sentencing judges to rely on
facts not admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. at 244.
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Circuit’s approach to a similar issue in United States v. Levy,12
in which two dissenting judges expressed harsh criticism of the
court’s rationale.13 Other circuits have been more flexible,
holding that when a relevant case is decided while an appeal is
pending, “a 28(j) letter is a perfectly appropriate avenue by
which to present” new arguments.14
This Note will argue that the Eleventh Circuit’s inflexible
approach denies litigants due process and frustrates the intent
behind recent changes to Rule 28(j). First, this Note will
examine the Eleventh Circuit’s approach to, and rejection of,
28(j) letters that attempt to raise new arguments based on cases
decided after the filing of appellate briefs by discussing several
Eleventh Circuit decisions, including Bordon, McGinnis v.
Ingram Equipment Co.15 and Levy. Part I will conclude with a
discussion of several cases in which the Eleventh Circuit has
maintained its refusal to hear post-brief supplemental authority
even when the Supreme Court has remanded the case for resentencing in light of the Court’s recent decisions. Part II will
analyze the Eleventh Circuit’s justification for its rule on new
issues raised by supplemental authority. Part III considers the
possible due process implications of the Eleventh Circuit’s
approach, and argues that the Eleventh Circuit’s rule is contrary
to the congressional intent behind recent changes to Rule 28(j).
This Note will then explore approaches of other Circuit Courts
of Appeal, most of which allow for new arguments when
authority is handed down after the deadline for appellate briefs,
and then examine the approach taken by state courts in handling
supplemental authority. Finally, this Note will call for an
addition to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to ensure
that litigants and defendants receive fair adjudication of their
claims.
12

United States v. Levy, 374 F.3d 1023 (11th Cir. 2004), reh’g denied
379 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2004), and reh’g denied en banc 391 F.3d 1327
(11th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, vacated 545 U.S. 1101 (2005), remanded to
416 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied 126 S. Ct. 643 (2005).
13
Levy, 391 F.3d at 1335-56 (Tjoflat and Barkett, JJ., dissenting).
14
United States v. Cordoza-Estrada, 385 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir. 2004).
15
McGinnis v. Ingram Equipment Co., 918 F.2d 1491 (11th Cir. 1990).
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I. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT AND REJECTION OF POST-BRIEF
SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY
The Eleventh Circuit has heard numerous cases in which
parties have attempted to raise a new issue based on post-brief
supplemental authority. In addition to cases such as Bordon, in
which the court declined to hear an argument rooted in the
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker,16 the
Eleventh Circuit has refused to hear arguments based on Blakely
v. Washington17 and Apprendi v. New Jersey.18 Bordon was
merely the latest case to highlight a dispute between Judge
James C. Hill and the majority of the judges on the Eleventh
Circuit. The disagreement among the judges of the Eleventh
Circuit dates back more than 15 years to McGinnis v. Ingram
Equipment Co., Inc.,19 in which Judge Hill dissented from a
majority decision applying the Eleventh Circuit’s rule rejecting
supplemental authority to civil cases.20 The majority opinion in
McGinnis articulated several reasons why declining to consider
arguments based on authority first raised in a supplemental
filing, such as a 28(j) letter, is not a “miscarriage of justice.”21
Subsequently, the Eleventh Circuit used the reasoning of
McGinnis and the doctrine of stare decisis to justify its rejection
of newly raised arguments, even when the Supreme Court has
remanded sentencing decisions for reconsideration.22 The

16

543 U.S. 220 (2005).
542 U.S. 296 (2004). The Blakely Court held that “the prosecutor
[must] prove to a jury all facts legally essential to the punishment” and that
sentencing determinations that occur without a jury determination of those
legally essential facts violate the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Id. at
313-14.
18
530 U.S. 466 (2000). In Apprendi, the Court invalidated a state
sentencing guideline scheme that allowed a judge to impose punishment based
on facts not admitted to by the defendant or proven to the jury. Id. at 491-92.
19
918 F.2d 1491 (11th Cir. 1990).
20
Id. at 1498.
21
Id. at 1496-97.
22
See, e.g., United States v. Cotney, 143 F. App’x 290 (11th Cir.
2005); United States v. Dockery, 401 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2005); United
17
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Eleventh Circuit’s rule was also the subject of spirited debate in
United States v. Levy, in which both the majority and dissenting
opinions weighed the benefits and drawbacks of the court’s strict
rule on supplemental authority.
A. United States v. Bordon
Luis Adel Bordon and his sons, Luis Bordon and Adel
Bordon, were convicted in August 1998 of “conspiring to
commit money laundering by conducting financial transactions
involving the proceeds of an illegal gambling activity and
concealing the nature and proceeds of the illegal gambling
activity.”23 A trial court sentenced the senior Bordon to 57
months in prison and his two sons to 46 months each;
additionally, all were ordered to forfeit their interest in
approximately $5.8 million.24
The district court judge imposed a lower sentence than was
required by the federal sentencing guidelines, finding that the
nature of the crime “departed from the heartland consideration
of the Sentencing Commission.”25 Other mitigating factors also
led the trial judge to impose a lesser sentence than that called for
in the sentencing guidelines.26 The Bordons appealed the
conviction and forfeiture order, and the government crossappealed from the trial judge’s downward departure from the

States v. Ardley, 242 F.3d 989 (11th Cir. 2001).
23
421 F.3d 1202, 1203 (11th Cir. 2005). The Bordons were convicted
of violations of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1955 (2005) and 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(h)
(2005). The Bordons were found to have been running a “bolita” operation.
Bordon, 421 F.3d at 1204. Bolita is “a game of chance having the character
of a lottery in which a bag of small numbered balls is tossed about until only
one remains or until one is grasped at random, the ball so selected being
considered as bearing the winning number.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 248 (Philip
Babcock Grove ed., Merriam Webster 1993).
24
Bordon, 421 F.3d at 1204.
25
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
26
Id.
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sentencing guidelines.27
The Eleventh Circuit upheld the Bordons’ convictions and
the forfeiture order, but remanded the case to the trial court for
re-sentencing, ruling that the district court judge had used the
wrong “base level” in determining the sentence.28 On remand,
in accordance with the direction of the Court of Appeals, the
district court sentenced the senior Bordon to 97 months and his
sons to 78 months each.29 The Bordons appealed, and the
Eleventh Circuit again vacated and remanded for new
sentencing, holding that the trial court incorrectly interpreted the
Court of Appeals’ ruling as stripping the judge of discretion to
depart downward from the sentencing guidelines.30
While the Eleventh Circuit was considering the Bordons’
second appeal, Congress passed the PROTECT Act31 and a
revised version of the sentencing guidelines that “probably”
would have resulted in a “significantly reduced guideline range”
for the Bordons.32 Section 3742(g)(1) of the PROTECT Act,
known as the Feeney Amendment, prevents district courts from
retroactively applying revisions to the sentencing guidelines.33
The district court sentenced the Bordons for a third time in
January 2004 based on the Eleventh Circuit’s remand and the
Feeney Amendment.34 The court sentenced Luis Adel Bordon to
97 months and Luis and Adel Bordon to 78 months,

27

Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Bordon, 228 F.3d 412 (11th Cir. 2000)
[hereinafter Bordon I]).
29
United States v. Bordon, 421 F.3d 1202, 1205 (11th Cir. 2005).
30
Id. (citing United States v. Bordon, 48 F. App’x 326 (11th Cir. 2002)
[hereinafter Bordon II]).
31
Id. PROTECT is an acronym for Prosecutorial Remedies and Other
Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003. Prosecutorial
Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C.).
32
United States v. Bordon, 421 F.3d 1202, 1205 (11th Cir. 2005).
33
Id.
34
Id.
28
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respectively.35 The Bordons appealed to the Eleventh Circuit for
a third time.36
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the Bordons’ arguments in
their entirety.37 The per curiam opinion noted that appellants
attempted, before oral argument, to assert that the district
court’s sentence was excessive in light of Booker.38 The court,
rejecting the claims first asserted in the supplemental filings,
held that the Bordons’ “Booker claim was not timely and [was]
thus subject to [the] court’s prudential rule.”39
Judge Hill concurred “with lack of enthusiasm.”40 Hill noted
his dissent in McGinnis, where he objected to the Eleventh
Circuit’s rule on supplemental authority.41 Hill concurred only
on the basis of stare decisis, with the hope that the doctrine
would be “tempered with fiat justita ruat coelum”42—a reference
to Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, Fla.,43 in which Chief Judge
Tuttle declared: “Let justice be done though the heavens may
fall.”44

35

Id.
Id.
37
Id. at 1206. The Bordons argued that: (1) the district court erred in
applying the Feeney Amendment; (2) the “retroactive application” doctrine of
the Feeney Amendment violated the ex post facto clause of the United States
Constitution (U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3); (3) the district court
miscalculated the monetary loss associated with the crime; and (4) the 17
months between the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Bordon II and the resentencing violated the Bordons’ right to sentencing without unreasonable
delay. Bordon, 421 F.3d at 1206.
38
United States v. Bordon, 421 F.3d 1202, 1206 n.1 (11th Cir. 2005).
39
Id.
40
Id. at 1208 (Hill, J., concurring).
41
Id.
42
Id. at 1209.
43
304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1962).
44
United States v. Bordon, 421 F.3d 1202, 1209 n.1 (11th Cir. 2005)
(Hill, J., concurring) (quoting Hampton, 304 F.2d at 330).
36
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B. McGinnis v. Ingram Equipment Co., Inc.
In a vital Eleventh Circuit case on this issue, Terrell
McGinnis filed a lawsuit against his former employer, Ingram
Equipment, following his termination in March 1986.45
McGinnis alleged discrimination in violation of the Civil Rights
Act of 186646 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,47 a
total of four claims.48 After a bench trial, the district court
entered a judgment for McGinnis, holding that Ingram
Equipment had violated the Civil Rights Act of 1866.49 Ingram
Equipment appealed, presenting four arguments in its brief.50 At
oral argument before a three-judge panel, Ingram argued that
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union51—decided four days before
the Eleventh Circuit heard arguments in McGinnis—should
control and limit federal jurisdiction over § 1981 claims.52 A
majority of the panel agreed with Ingram, vacating the judgment
and remanding the case for reconsideration in light of
Patterson.53 The Eleventh Circuit vacated the panel’s decision
and agreed to hear the case en banc.54
Sitting en banc, the Eleventh Circuit rejected Ingram’s

45

McGinnis v. Ingram Equipment Co., Inc., 918 F.2d 1491, 1493 (11th
Cir. 1990).
46
Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (2005).
47
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (2005).
48
McGinnis, 918 F.2d at 1493.
49
Id.
50
Id. Ingram asserted that (1) McGinnis failed to prove intentional
discrimination; (2) the district court’s findings of fact were clearly erroneous
and should be set aside; (3) the district court erred in restricting the use of
McGinnis’s pre-trial deposition at trial; and (4) the trial judge “impermissibly
injected himself into the proceedings.” Id.
51
491 U.S. 164 (1989).
52
McGinnis v. Ingram Equipment Co., Inc., 918 F.2d 1491, 1493 (11th
Cir. 1990).
53
Id.
54
Id.

PRIOR OUT

3/5/2007 12:35 AM

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT & SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY 257
Patterson appeal.55 The court noted that “[a] party normally
waives its right to argue issues not raised in its initial brief.”56
The court rejected Ingram’s argument that it could not have
predicted the outcome of Patterson, reasoning that the appellant
was free to assert a lack of jurisdiction regardless of the
Supreme Court’s Patterson holding.57
Judge Hill dissented, noting, “[t]his is a hard case. The
court, today, makes bad law.”58 Hill argued that the Supreme
Court’s decision in Patterson limited federal jurisdiction over §
1981 claims.59 The dissent accused the majority of ignoring the
law, and instead seeking the “morally right result”60 of holding
a company liable for discrimination when an employee “suffered
many more racial indignities at the hands of the Company than
any one citizen should be called upon to bear in a lifetime.”61
Additionally, Judge Hill asserted that the Eleventh Circuit
put appellate litigants in the uncomfortable position of having to
choose between losing an argument to waiver or being subject to
possible sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.62 Hill expressed concern that the majority’s rule
forced appellate counsel to confront a “Hobbesian dilemma:”
refrain from making an argument because of existing adverse
case law and thus lose that argument in future proceedings, or
make the argument and risk Rule 11 sanctions.63 He whimsically
suggested that attorneys facing such a dilemma “consult their
local astrologer or psychic to find out whether existing case law
55

Id. at 1496.
Id. (citing FSLIC v. Haralson, 813 F.2d 370, 373 n.3 (11th Cir.
1987); Rogero v. Noone, 704 F.2d 518, 520 n.1 (11th Cir. 1983)).
57
McGinnis v. Ingram Equipment Co., Inc., 918 F.2d 1491, 1496 (11th
Cir. 1990).
58
Id. at 1498 (Hill, J., dissenting).
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. (quoting McGinnis v. Ingram Equipment Co., 685 F. Supp. 224,
228 (N.D. Ala. 1988)).
62
McGinnis v. Ingram Equipment Co., Inc., 918 F.2d 1491, 1499 (11th
Cir. 1990).
63
Id. at 1500.
56
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in the area will change.”64 Perhaps more seriously, Hill
suggested that attorneys facing the Hobbesian dilemma “consult
their malpractice insurers in case their astrologer or psychic’s
vision [was] not too clear.”65
The majority responded to Judge Hill’s stinging dissent. The
court asserted that despite the contrary assertions of Ingram
Equipment and Judge Hill, the issue of federal jurisdiction over
§ 1981 claims was available prior to Patterson.66 The majority
noted that Patterson was decided by the Fourth Circuit four
months before McGinnis’ claims went to trial and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari on the § 1981 issue three months before
trial.67
The majority also dismissed Judge Hill’s concerns about
potential Rule 11 sanctions for an appellate attorney that
advanced a novel legal argument in the face of adverse
precedent.68 The court, citing advisory committee notes on a
1983 amendment to Rule 11, noted the Rule’s good faith
provision, saying that the Rule “is not intended to chill an
attorney’s enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal
theories.”69 The court distinguished the cases Judge Hill cited in
support of his concerns about Rule 11 sanctions from McGinnis,
noting that the attorneys in those cases had misrepresented the
law.70

64

Id. at 1501.
Id. at 1501 n.11.
66
Id. at 1496.
67
Id.
68
McGinnis v. Ingram Equipment Co., Inc., 918 F.2d 1491, 1496 (11th
Cir. 1990).
69
Id.
70
Id. at 1496-97.
65
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C. The Eleventh Circuit’s New Issue Dispute Revisited:
United States v. Levy
1. Background
The Eleventh Circuit’s rule against hearing new issues based
on supplemental filings was a matter of debate in United States
v. Levy.71 Levy’s first appeal to the Eleventh Circuit recounted
the facts of his case. A federal grand jury indicted Raphael Levy
and 12 others on 52 counts of various offenses related to a large
fraud scheme.72 Levy and his codefendants were accused of
soliciting funds for investing in viatical settlements—schemes
which involve the purchase of life insurance policies or benefits
thereof at a discounted rate from terminally ill persons—then
misappropriating funds for their own use.73
Levy was charged with multiple counts of mail fraud,
conspiracy to commit money laundering, and money
laundering.74 In a written plea agreement, Levy pled guilty to
conspiracy to commit mail fraud and conspiracy to commit
money laundering.75 The plea agreement stated Levy could be
sentenced to any term provided for by the sentencing guidelines,
and that he waived his right to appeal any sentence imposed.76
In exchange for his plea, the government dismissed the
remaining counts against Levy.77 The government further agreed
not to oppose Levy’s request for sentence reduction based on his
acceptance of responsibility, to consider filing a sentence
reduction motion pursuant to § 5K1.1 of the United States
71

United States v. Levy, 374 F.3d 1023 (11th Cir. 2004), reh’g denied
379 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2004), and reh’g denied en banc 391 F.3d 1327
(11th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, vacated 545 U.S. 1101 (2005), remanded to
416 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied 126 S. Ct. 643 (2005).
72
Levy, 374 F.3d at 1024.
73
Id. at 1024-25.
74
Id. at 1025.
75
Id.
76
United States v. Levy, 374 F.3d 1023, 1025-26 (11th Cir. 2004).
77
Id. at 1025.
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Sentencing Guidelines, and to stipulate that Levy derived
approximately $10.9 million from the scheme.78 The government
also agreed to recommend that the district court impose
concurrent sentences on the counts to which Levy pled guilty.79
The Pre-sentence Investigation Report (“PSI”) filed by a
probation officer recommended numerous enhancements to
Levy’s sentence based on the amount of money involved in the
scheme, the level of planning and sophistication, the
vulnerability of the victims, and Levy’s leadership role.80 Based
on Levy’s criminal history and terms of his plea agreement, he
was eligible for a sentence of between 135 and 168 months.81
The PSI noted that under the sentencing guidelines, a concurrent
sentence is proper unless the highest maximum sentence is less
than the total punishment recommended by the guidelines.82
Aware that such a situation existed in Levy’s case, the PSI
recommended consecutive sentences.83 Upset with the possible
deviation from the sentencing guidelines, Levy objected to the
PSI on several occasions.84
At Levy’s sentencing hearing, the district court, despite
Levy’s objections, heard evidence regarding the vulnerability of
the victims of the scheme.85 The government fulfilled its
obligation
and
recommended
concurrent
sentences.86
Nevertheless, the district court sentenced Levy to 120- and 48-

78

Id.
Id.
80
Id. at 1026.
81
United States v. Levy, 374 F.3d 1023, 1026 (11th Cir. 2004).
82
Id.
83
Id. The highest maximum sentence for the most serious crime to
which Levy pled guilty was 120 months—15 months less than the 135-month
minimum required by the sentencing guidelines. Id.
84
Id. at 1027-28.
85
Id. at 1028-29. The government, citing the terms of the plea
agreement, noted that it could not itself offer any evidence on the
vulnerability of Levy’s victims. Id. at 1028. Instead, the court heard
testimony from an attorney representing three victims in bankruptcy
proceedings and from varied victims. Id. at 1028-29.
86
United States v. Levy, 374 F.3d 1023, 1029 (11th Cir. 2004).
79
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month sentences to be served consecutively, a total of 168
months.87 Levy appealed his sentence to the Eleventh Circuit,
contending that the government breached the plea agreement and
that the district court deprived him of due process by hearing
evidence regarding the vulnerability of his victims.88
The Eleventh Circuit rejected Levy’s appeals.89 Levy
petitioned for re-hearing, arguing in part that the Supreme
Court’s decision in Blakely, requiring all facts relevant to a
sentence under the federal guidelines, was controlling.90 The
Eleventh Circuit rejected his Blakely claim, holding that Levy
waived that argument by not “timely rais[ing] it in his initial
brief on appeal.”91 The court conceded Levy’s inability to
predict the Supreme Court’s ruling in Blakely, but noted that the
argument that sentences based on facts not determined by a jury
violate the Sixth Amendment was available to Levy before the
Court’s decision.92 In short, the Eleventh Circuit held that the
Blakely issue was available to Levy before his petition for
rehearing.93
2. Levy’s Petition for En Banc Rehearing
Levy requested an en banc hearing of his appeal on the
Blakely issue.94 Once again, the Eleventh Circuit rejected his
argument as untimely.95 The court reiterated its “long-standing
rule that issues raised for the first time in a petition for
rehearing and not raised in an appellant’s initial brief will not be
considered.”96 This section will first analyze the arguments of
the two dissenting opinions—filed by Judge Tjoflat and Judge
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

Id. 1029.
Id. at 1029-30.
Id. at 1030-35.
United States v. Levy, 379 F.3d 1241, 1241-42 (11th Cir. 204).
Id. at 1242.
Id. at 1243 n.3.
Id. at 1243.
United States v. Levy, 391 F.3d 1327, 1328 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id.
Id.
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Barkett—and then discuss the majority’s approach. 97
a. The Dissenting Opinions
The two dissenting opinions raised four objections to the
majority’s rule: (1) the Eleventh Circuit’s rule, as it applies to
criminal cases, limits the principles of retroactivity when new
law is handed down while a criminal case is pending; (2) the
Eleventh Circuit erred by deeming Levy’s Blakely argument as
waived rather than forfeited; (3) it left the Eleventh Circuit
alone among Circuit Courts of Appeal; and (4) it encouraged
appellate counsel to brief every possible issue for fear of losing
an unraised issue to Eleventh Circuit procedural rules.98
Judge Tjoflat first argued the majority’s decision conflicted
with Supreme Court precedent on retroactivity.99 In Griffith v.
Kentucky,100 the Supreme Court held that “a new rule for the
conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to
all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet
final.”101 Tjoflat noted that the Supreme Court said that failure
to apply decisions retroactively “violates basic norms of
constitutional adjudication.”102 He further claimed that the
Eleventh Circuit “essentially superimposed an additional
requirement onto retroactivity determinations”—a requirement
that the defendant had previously raised the issue upon which
the Supreme Court subsequently ruled.103
97

Judge Tjoflat, joined by Judge Barkett, dissented from a similar ruling
using similar rationale. See United States v. Ardley, 273 F.3d 991, 995-1006
(11th Cir. 2001) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting).
98
Levy, 391 F.3d at 1336-37 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting).
99
Id. at 1337-38.
100
479 U.S. 314 (1987).
101
Id. at 328. A criminal judgment is final when “a judgment of
conviction has been rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the
time for a petition for certiorari elapsed or a petition for certiorari finally
denied.” Id. at 321 n.6.
102
United States v. Levy, 391 F.3d 1327, 127 (11th Cir. 2004) (Tjoflat,
J., dissenting) (quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987)).
103
Id. at 1340-41 (citations omitted).
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The dissent also took issue with what Judge Tjoflat perceived
as the court’s mischaracterization of Levy’s Blakely argument as
“waived.”104 Tjoflat distinguished “waiver,” the “intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right,”105 from
“forfeiture,” “the failure to make the timely assertion of a
right,”106 and argued that Levy could only have forfeited a
Blakely argument because he was unaware of any such
argument.107 Tjoflat noted that Levy’s first appellate brief was
filed with the Eleventh Circuit more than a year before the
Supreme Court even granted certiorari in Blakely.108 In addition,
Tjoflat noted that the Eleventh Circuit precedent regarding the
constitutionality of the federal sentencing guidelines was
squarely against Levy.109 In effect, Tjoflat asserted that the
Eleventh Circuit had ruled that Levy knowingly relinquished a
right he did not know existed.110
Judge Tjoflat also criticized the majority’s statement that its
rule against hearing new issues was a long-standing one.111 The
dissent cited Eleventh Circuit opinions in which the court
considered previously unraised objections based on new case
law.112 Tjoflat pointed to other circuits which consistently follow
a different rule concerning arguments based on newly issued
104

Id. at 1342.
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (quoting Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
106
Id. at 733.
107
Levy, 391 F.3d at 1341 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting).
108
United States v. Levy, 391 F.3d 1327, 1341-42 (11th Cir. 2004).
109
Id. at 1342. The Eleventh Circuit had previously rejected an
argument that the Sixth Amendment precluded a judicial determination,
without a jury finding, of facts that would increase a defendant’s sentence.
United States v. Sanchez, 269 F.3d 1250, 1262 (11th Cir. 2001).
110
Levy, 391 F.3d at 1342 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting).
111
Id. at 1343.
112
Id. at 1343-44. Justice Tjoflat cited United States v. Candelario, 240
F.3d 1300, 1311 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that the court would review a
previously unraised Apprendi argument for plain error) and United States v.
Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 529 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating that the court would
review an issue raised first in defendant’s reply brief and relying upon a
recent Supreme Court decision for plain error).
105
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authority.113 In his decision, Judge Tjoflat included two
footnotes spanning most of three pages discussing pre- and postBlakely decisions from other circuit courts in which the courts
considered a new issue based on recent authority.114 Tjoflat
chided the Eleventh Circuit, saying that he “[did] not understand
how this court [could] continue to reject the sound reasoning of
our sister circuits without any sort of explanation or even an
acknowledgment of those cases.”115
Finally, Judge Tjoflat expressed concern that the Eleventh
Circuit’s rule would “[send] a clear message to appellate counsel
that they should brief any claim that passes the laugh test
regardless of whether it has any support in, or is even squarely
foreclosed by, our own precedent.”116 He cited Supreme Court
and Eleventh Circuit precedent expressing concern that if
appellate courts have too strict a rule on hearing arguments,
counsel would have incentive to raise every conceivable issue at
every point in the judicial process.117
For example, Judge Tjoflat noted Johnson v. United
States,118 the Supreme Court worried that an inflexible rule
against hearing new issues, especially issues that might
conceivably be foreclosed by the Eleventh Circuit’s Bordon/Levy
rule, “would result in counsel’s inevitably making a long and
virtually useless laundry list of objections to rulings that were
plainly supported by existing precedent.”119 Similarly, Judge
Tjoflat pointed out that the Eleventh Circuit has warned
attorneys “to be highly selective about the issues to be argued on
appeal.”120 The court advised attorneys to “select with
113

United States v. Levy, 391 F.3d 1327, 1345 (11th Cir. 2004)
(Tjoflat, J., dissenting).
114
Id.
115
Id. at 1348.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 1348-50.
118
520 U.S. 461 (1997).
119
Id. at 468.
120
United States v. Levy, 391 F.3d 1327, 1349 (11th Cir. 2004)
(Tjoflat, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Battle, 163 F.3d 1, 1-2 (11th
Cir. 1998)).
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dispassionate and detached mind[s] the issues that common sense
and experience tell [them] are likely to be dispositive. [They]
must reject other issues or give them short treatment.”121
Judge Tjoflat worried that the Eleventh Circuit’s virtual
blanket rule rejecting new issues raised in supplemental authority
“essentially tell[s] counsel that they should ‘raise every colorable
claim on appeal,’ and that if they are too ‘highly selective about
the issues to be argued on appeal’ they may do a great injury to
their clients.”122 Tjoflat expressed concern that “counsel [would]
raise more claims on appeal . . .and that the arguments
supporting those claims [would] necessarily be less clear and
specific.”123 The effect on the justice system would be severe:
“Such kitchen-sink briefs will, of course, make this court’s work
more difficult and waste judicial resources, not to mention
counsel’s own time.”124
Judge Barkett joined Judge Tjoflat in dissenting. Barkett
noted that “Levy could not have raised a Sixth Amendment
objection to his sentencing because in United States v. Sanchez,
[decided] three years before Blakely was handed down, [the
Eleventh Circuit] held that Apprendi does not apply to the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.”125 Noting that “[o]ur internal
circuit rules for how and whether an issue can be raised on
appeal cannot override the concerns about fundamental fairness
and the integrity of judicial review that the Supreme Court
identified in Griffith,”126 Judge Barkett said the Eleventh Circuit
might be “violat[ing] constitutional norms.”127
Finally, Barkett agreed with Tjoflat on the potential impact
121

Battle, 163 F.3d at 2 (quoting John C. Godbold, Twenty Pages and
Twenty Minutes Revisited 14 (1987) (revised version of Twenty Pages and
Twenty Minutes—Effective Advocacy on Appeal, 30 SW. L.J. 801 (1976)).
122
Levy, 391 F.3d at 1349-50 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original).
123
Id. at 1350.
124
Id.
125
Id. at 1351 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (emphasis in
original).
126
United States v. Levy, 391 F.3d 1327, 1351 (11th Cir. 2004).
127
Id.
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of the Eleventh Circuit’s rule on the judicial system.128 Barkett
argued that the court’s rule gives litigants “an incentive to flood
the federal courts with countless claims that are clearly
foreclosed by current precedent . . . . The district courts (and
this court) will then be forced to address those claims over and
over again. This is not a very effective way of conserving scarce
judicial resources.”129
b. The Majority Response
The majority opinion defended its rule against the dissent’s
arguments. The court narrowly construed Griffith, saying that
the decision did not affect procedural rules on unpreserved or
unraised issues,130 dismissed concerns about overburdened
courts,131 and addressed concerns that the majority had confused
waiver and forfeiture.132
While acknowledging that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Griffith applied new law to pending criminal prosecutions, the
Levy majority found that “nothing in Griffith saved an
unpreserved error in a direct appeal.”133 Additionally, the Levy
court noted that the Supreme Court itself had limited
retroactivity, saying that application of new rules should be
“subject, of course, to established principles of waiver, harmless
error, and the like.”134
The majority distinguished the Court’s retroactive application
of a new rule in Griffith from Levy. In Griffith, the Eleventh
Circuit explained, the defendants repeatedly challenged the
government’s use of preemptory challenges to prospective
jurors.135 The Levy court noted that the “defendants properly

128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135

Id. at 1356 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1329.
Id. at 1332.
United States v. Levy, 391 F.3d 1327, 1334-35 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1329.
Id. at 1331 (citing Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51, 59 n.4 (1985)).
Id. at 1330.
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presented and preserved their constitutional challenges to the
prosecution’s use of preemptory strikes both during trial and
throughout direct review.”136 The opinion employed a narrow
reading of Griffith, saying that the Supreme Court’s holding in
that case “cannot, and does not, control a situation in which the
defendant, such as Levy, never raised nor preserved a
constitutional challenge, but, instead, raises it for the first time
in a petition for rehearing after this Court has affirmed his
conviction and sentence.”137
The Levy majority also dismissed concerns about overburdened courts forced to consider every conceivable claim. The
court noted that attorneys already have a procedural incentive to
raise all claims, yet refrain from doing so. “If defendants were
going to raise a long and useless laundry list of objections, they
already would have been doing exactly that in the district court
so objections could receive full de novo review by this Court,
rather than plain-error review.”138 The majority also claimed
that any concerns regarding over-burdened trial courts were
unfounded because the Eleventh Circuit’s rule allows for issues
to be raised in the initial brief to the court.139
Finally, the majority opinion said that the dissent
misunderstood the waiver/forfeiture distinction. The majority
argued that “the issue is whether this Court will apply its wellestablished procedural rules” and not consider claims not raised
in an initial brief, rather than the distinction between waiver,
forfeiture or abandonment.140
The court accused the dissent of being “internally
inconsistent” by recognizing that procedural rules can and
should be enforced when considering issues not raised at trial,
but denying the circuit court the power to apply procedural rules
to issues not properly raised early in the appellate process.141

136
137
138
139
140
141

Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 1331.
United States v. Levy, 391 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id.
Id. at 1334.
Id. at 1335.
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The majority questioned why “[t]he dissent never explain[ed]
why enforcing trial-level procedural default rules by limiting
appellate review to plain error is somehow permissible under the
Supreme Court’s retroactivity doctrine, but enforcing appellatelevel procedural default rules is not.”142 In closing, the Eleventh
Circuit majority defended its rule, saying “[t]his Court’s
application of well-established procedural rules is prudent and
well-established.”143
Despite being rebuffed twice by the Eleventh Circuit, Levy
continued to press his appeal. The Supreme Court vacated his
sentence and remanded to the Eleventh Circuit for further
consideration in light of Booker.144 The Eleventh Circuit’s
response to the remand highlights the court’s unrelenting
rejection of new issues raised after appellate briefs are filed.
D. The Eleventh Circuit and Remands From the United
States Supreme Court
The Eleventh Circuit, in its third hearing of Levy’s claims,
declined to allow for review of his Booker claim.145 This marked
one of several occasions where the Eleventh Circuit has
enforced its procedural rule against hearing post-brief
supplemental authority even when expressly ordered by the
Supreme Court to reconsider a case.
In United States v. Ardley,146 the Eleventh Circuit declined
to hear an appeal of a criminal sentence based on the High
Court’s ruling in Apprendi, saying “[n]othing in the Apprendi
decision suggests that we are obligated to consider an issue not
raised in any of the briefs that appellant has filed with us.”147
142

Id.
Id.
144
United States v. Levy, 125 S. Ct. 2542 (2005).
145
United States v. Levy, 416 F.3d 1273, 1279-80 (11th Cir. 2005).
146
United States v. Ardley, 202 F.3d 287 (11th Cir. 1999), cert.
granted, vacated 531 U.S. 1063 (2001), remanded to 242 F.3d 989 (11th Cir.
2001), cert. denied 533 U.S. 962 (2001), reh’g denied en banc 273 F.3d 991
(11th Cir. 2001), cert. denied 535 U.S. 979 (2002).
147
Ardley, 242 F.3d at 990.
143
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The Eleventh Circuit stuck by its rule on supplemental
authority in Ardley even after a remand order in the case from
the Supreme Court. The court held the Apprendi decision did
not require consideration of an issue that had not been raised in
any of the appellant’s briefs.148 The Eleventh Circuit decided
there was nothing in the Supreme Court’s remand order
“requiring that [it] treat the case as though the Apprendi issue
had been timely raised in this Court.”149 Noting its own
precedent, the court held that a remand order does not mandate
a specific outcome.150
Similarly, when Raphael Levy came before the Eleventh
Circuit for the third time in 2005 on remand from the Supreme
Court the Eleventh Circuit rejected his Booker appeal, saying
that the Supreme Court’s remand did not “mandate any
particular outcome as to the defendant’s sentence, nor [did the
remand] preclude this Court from applying its prudential rules in
a uniform and consistent manner.”151 The Eleventh Circuit again
noted that principles of retroactivity are subject to procedural
rules.152 The court pointed to Shea, where the Supreme Court
held that retroactivity is subject “to established principles of
waiver, harmless error, and the like.”153
148

Id.
Id.
150
Id. See United States v. Miller, 492 F.2d 37, 40 (5th Cir. 1974)
(holding that if the Supreme Court expected a specific result, “certiorari
could have been granted and [the] case summarily reversed . . . rather than
being remanded for further consideration”). The Fifth Circuit decision predated that circuit’s split and is binding on the Eleventh Circuit. See Bonner v.
City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (“This is the
first case to be heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit . . . . We hold that the decisions of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit . . . shall be binding as precedent in the
Eleventh Circuit”).
151
United States v. Levy, 416 F.3d 1273, 1280 (11th Cir. 2005).
152
Id. at 1277. The Booker court expected “reviewing courts to apply
ordinary prudential doctrines, determining, for example, whether the issue
was raised below and whether it fails the ‘plain-error’ test.” Booker, 543
U.S. at 225.
153
Levy, 416 F.3d at 1277 (quoting Shea, 451 U.S. at 58 n.4).
149
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The Eleventh Circuit also relied on recent Supreme Court
precedent that arguably matches the circuit court’s approach to
supplemental authority. Specifically, the Levy court noted154 the
Supreme Court’s decision in Pasquantino v. United States,155 in
which the Court declined to consider a Blakely claim not raised
in the defendant’s petition for certiorari.156 Just as in the
Eleventh Circuit, the High Court’s ruling was subject to
criticism in the dissent, with Justice Ginsburg asserting that the
failure to raise a Blakely/Booker claim “was no fault of the
defendant’s . . . as the petition in this case was filed and granted
well before the Court decided Blakely.”157 Though the Supreme
Court’s rule in Pasquantino seems to lend an air of legitimacy to
the Eleventh Circuit’s approach to supplement authority, the
High Court’s rule is both distinguishable from the Eleventh
Circuit’s rule and contrary to the Supreme Court’s own
established precedent.
To begin, a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court
serves a different purpose than an appellate brief. An appellate
brief lists all issues presented for review,158 but is filed after a
circuit court has agreed to hear a case. A petition to the
Supreme Court for certiorari requires a similar statement of
issues.159 However, the Supreme Court, as the court of last
review, has limited jurisdiction and uses petitions for certiorari
to weed out cases and issues it will not review.160 Unlike a

154

Id.
544 U.S. 349 (2005).
156
Id. at 372 n.14.
157
Id. at 377 n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
158
See FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(5).
159
See SUP. CT. R. 14.1(a).
160
See Yee v. City of Escondido, Cal., 503 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1992).
The Court held that Rule 14.1 “provides the respondent with notice of the
grounds on which certiorari is sought, thus relieving him of the expense of
unnecessary litigation on the merits and the burden of opposing certiorari on
unpresented questions. It also assists the Court in selecting the cases in which
certiorari will be granted.” Id. The Court further noted that “[b]y forcing the
parties to focus on the questions the Court views as particularly important,
the Rule enables the Court to use its resources efficiently.” Id. at 521.
155
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circuit court, the Supreme Court is not concerned with the
outcome of a particular case, but instead with expansive legal
issues.161 Therefore, the Court has more leeway to reject claims
that may be dispositive in a particular case if the issue does not
present the Court with a chance to hand down broad, binding
precedent. For that reason, the Court has stated that denying
review of claims not presented in the petition for certiorari
“help[s] to maintain the integrity of the process of certiorari.”162
The Supreme Court’s approach to new issues raised after
petitions for certiorari are filed is somewhat inconsistent. The
rule in Pasquantino is in conflict with its own precedent. The
Court has held that it may review issues not raised in a
certiorari petition for plain error.163 Therefore, rather than
establishing a broad rule, the Pasquantino disposition of a new
issue could be seen as a legitimate exercise of the Supreme
Court’s discretion to adjudicate only cases addressing broad
issues. At worst, the Supreme Court has a division within its
ranks on this issue similar to that in the Tenth Circuit, which is
the only circuit that has dealt with the problem of new issues
raised after the filing of appellate briefs in the same manner as
the Eleventh Circuit.164
161

Martin Guggenheim, State Intervention in the Family: Making a
Federal Case Out of It, 45 OHIO ST. L. J. 399, 410 (1984) (“correction of
error in any particular case is not and should not be the primary purpose of
the Supreme Court”). See also Howard S. Chasanow, Petitions for
Certiorari-View from the Bench, APML MD-CLE 24-307 (2001) (“The
purpose of the petition for certiorari is not to argue the merits of the appeal,
but to convince the court that the case requires review because of the public
interest or public importance of the issues involved.”).
162
Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 646 (1992). The Court
also points out the Supreme Court Rules expressly forbid raising issues not
raised in a petition for certiorari. Id. at 645 (quoting SUP. CT. R. 24.1(a)).
163
See Silber v. United States, 370 U.S. 717, 717-18 (1962) (“While
ordinarily we do not take note of errors not called to the attention of the
Court of Appeals nor properly raised here, that rule is not without exception.
The Court has the power to notice a plain error.”) (internal quotations
omitted); Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22, 34 (1939) (“We have the power
[to hear unraised issues] in the case of plain error.”)
164
See infra Part V.
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II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S REJECTION OF
NEW ISSUES BASED ON POST-BRIEF AUTHORITY
The Eleventh Circuit’s approach to new issues raised in
supplemental filings may be in conflict with other circuits, but it
is not completely unjustifiable. Though the court has rarely seen
fit to explain its rule, an evaluation of circumstances in which
the Eleventh Circuit has deviated from the general rule against
hearing new issues raised on appeal but not raised in the trial
court is helpful in explaining its rationale for rejecting unbriefed issues. When discussing its reasoning, the court has put
forth the same justifications that have been used to justify the
“general rule,”165 including judicial economy and avoidance of
prejudice to appellate parties.166 The Eleventh Circuit has further
noted that allowing new issues to be raised in supplemental
filings would conflict with the language of Rules 28(a)(5) and
28(j) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.167
A. New Issues That Do Not Require Additional Facts
Though the court has never explicitly said so, perhaps the
Eleventh Circuit rejects new issues raised in supplemental filings
because of the problems that arise when an appeals court tries to
review an incomplete factual record. Often, when the Eleventh
Circuit has departed from the general rule, it has done so only
when additional facts would not aid the court’s determination of
a new issue.168
165

For a full discussion of the rationale for the general rule, see
Martineau, supra note 4, at 1026 and Dennerline, supra note 6, at 987-92.
For a discussion of exceptions to the general rule, see Martineau, supra note
4, at 1045-56 and Dennerline, supra note 6, at 996-1003.
166
McGinnis v. Ingram Equipment Co., 918 F.2d 1491, 1495 (11th Cir.
1990).
167
United States v. Smith, 416 F.3d 1350, 1352 n.1 (11th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Levy, 379 F.3d 1241, 1243-44 (11th Cir. 2004). The
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure state that a brief must contain “a
statement of the issues presented for review.” FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(5).
168
In passing, the court has noted that hearing of new issues on appeal is

PRIOR OUT

3/5/2007 12:35 AM

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT & SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY 273
For example, in Higginbotham v. Ford Motor Co.,169 the
court agreed to hear an automobile manufacturer’s argument that
Georgia law did not provide for a wrongful death action under
theories of breach of warranty or strict liability.170 The Eleventh
Circuit held that “the new theory raises a purely legal question”
and that “[n]o facts could have been developed to aid our
resolution of the issue.”171 The court said under such
circumstances, “it would be unjust now to refuse to consider the
new argument.”172
The Eleventh Circuit’s concern for an adequately developed
factual record has been stated in numerous other cases, and predates the split of the Fifth Circuit and creation of the Eleventh
Circuit. In Evans v. Triple R Welding & Oil Field Maintenance
Corp.,173 the Fifth Circuit heard an appeal based on an alternate
reading of the language of a contract.174 The third-party plaintiff
in Evans, J. Ray McDermott & Co., Inc., sought
indemnification in a lawsuit brought by a McDermott employee
based on an express warranty contained in the contract between
McDermott and Triple R.175 The Fifth Circuit noted that “[a]ll
of the evidence pertaining to the case [was] in the record,
including the contract between McDermott and Triple R, and
there [was] no failure therefore to have adequate evidence before
the Court.”176
The Fifth Circuit emphasized the need for a complete factual

especially appropriate when the court below has granted summary judgment.
Fane v. Edenfield, 945 F.2d 1514, 1519 n.11 (11th Cir. 1991). While the
court declined to articulate a reason, presumably the court feels that the
potential for a miscarriage of justice is greater when a pre-trial remedy
removes a party’s ability to develop legal theories or factual underpinnings.
169
540 F.2d 762 (11th Cir. 1976).
170
Id. at 767-68.
171
Id. at 768 n.10. The issue was raised in the original appellate briefs
as per the court’s request. Id.
172
Id.
173
472 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1973).
174
Id. at 716.
175
Id. at 715-16.
176
Id. at 716.
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record even concerning meritorious new arguments. For
example, in Empire Life Insurance Co. of America v. Valdak
Corp.,177 the Fifth Circuit remanded for additional proceedings
in order to develop facts related to a newly raised issue.178 The
Eleventh Circuit, following pre-split precedent, allowed a new
issue related to choice of law to be heard upon appeal in Roofing
& Sheet Metal Services, Inc. v. La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc.,179
and remanded for additional fact-finding so a new issue could be
fairly litigated in Caban-Wheeler v. Elsea.180
B. Allowing New Issues to Be Presented on Appeal Violates
Rule 28
Though it is difficult to discern whether the Eleventh Circuit
refrains from hearing new issues on appeal specifically because
of the potential for an inadequate factual record, the court has
specifically stated that adherence to the language of Rules
28(a)(5) and 28(j) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
requires that new issues not be heard on appeal. In United States
v. Levy, the court noted that “[t]o allow a new issue to be raised
in a petition for rehearing circumvents Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 28(a)(5), which requires that an appellant’s initial
brief must contain ‘a statement of the issues presented for
review.’”181 The court stuck to its interpretation, and quoted
Levy, in United States v. Smith.182 The Eleventh Circuit further
elaborated its position in United States v. Nealy, stating once
again, “[p]arties must submit all issues on appeal in their initial
briefs.”183 The court admitted that supplemental filings have
their role, but that role does not include raising new issues:
“When new authority arises after a brief is filed, this circuit

177
178
179
180
181
182
183

468 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 334.
689 F.2d 982, 989-91 (11th Cir. 1982).
904 F.2d 1549, 1557 (11th Cir. 1990).
United States v. Levy, 416 F.3d 1273, 1276 (11th Cir. 2005).
416 F.3d 1350, 1352, n.1 (11th Cir. 2005).
United States v. Nealy, 232 F.3d 825, 830 (11th Cir. 2000).
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permits parties to submit supplemental authority on ‘intervening
decisions or new developments’ regarding issues already
properly raised in the initial briefs.”184 The court concluded,
“parties cannot properly raise new issues at supplemental
briefing, even if the issues arise based on the intervening
decisions or new developments cited in the supplemental
authority.”185
The court supported its argument with a strict interpretation
of Rule 28(j). In an earlier hearing of Levy’s appeal, the
Eleventh Circuit held that new issues may not be raised in a
28(j) letter because the rule “specifically states that a party must
‘state the reasons for the supplemental citations, referring either
to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally.’”186 The
court, in a crushing blow to those hoping to raise a new issue
based on post-brief authority, held that the language of Rule
28(j) “underscores that an appellant’s supplemental authority
must relate to an issue previously raised in a proper fashion, and
that an appellant cannot raise a wholly new issue in a
supplemental authority or brief.”187 For those reasons, the court
has retained a strict rule against hearing new issues raised late in
the appellate process—one that raises questions of fairness to
both civil litigants and criminal defendants.
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S APPROACH
While the Eleventh Circuit is acting lawfully when it
enforces its procedural rules, two problems with the court’s
approach require a change in the circuit’s position. First, the
Eleventh Circuit’s rule has potential due process implications. It
could be argued that the court deprives litigants of the
“opportunity to present [their] case and be heard,”188 and

184

Id. (quoting 11th Cir. R. 28-1 I.O.P. 6) (emphasis in original).
Id.
186
United States v. Levy, 379 F.3d 1241, 1244 (11th Cir. 2004)
(quoting FED. R. APP. P. 28(j)) (emphasis in original).
187
Id. at 1244.
188
Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 681
185
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thereby robs them of due process. Second, the Eleventh
Circuit’s rule operates contrary to the intent behind recent
changes to Rule 28(j) of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure which allow argument in filings noting supplemental
authority.189
A. Due Process and the Right to Be Heard
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution protect citizens from deprivations of life, liberty or
property without due process of law.190 The Supreme Court has
noted the due process guarantee extends to judicial
proceedings,191 holding that due process, in its “primary sense,”
means “an opportunity to be heard and to defend [a] substantive
right.”192 The Court later said that “[t]he fundamental requisite
of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.”193
While the Bordons and other litigants who face rejection of a
new issue have not been entirely deprived of their right to be
heard, they have been barred from arguing a potentially
dispositive issue. Professors Adam Milani and Michael Smith
argue that “being denied an opportunity that ultimately proves
dispositive of a case is no different than a complete denial of an

(1930).
189

Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Appellate, Bankruptcy, Civil, and Criminal Procedure, at 46, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/comment2001/amendments/toc.htm.
190
U.S. CONST. amends. V, VIX, § 1. See also Adam A. Milani &
Michael R. Smith, Playing God: A Critical Look at Sua Sponte Decisions by
Appellate Courts, 69 TENN. L. REV. 245, 262 (2002).
191
Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings, 281 U.S. at 680 (“The federal
guarantee of due process extends to state action through its judicial as well as
through its legislative, executive or administrative branch of government.”).
192
Id. at 678.
193
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950) (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)). See also
Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 466 (2000) (holding that a
litigant’s opportunity to be heard on his claims is “fundamental to due
process.”).
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opportunity to be heard.”194 Milani and Smith note that without
the chance to present arguments on a dispositive issue, “the
opportunity to be heard is but a ‘teasing illusion.’”195
Additionally, Professor Robert Martineau has argued that
“[f]ailure to hear the parties on the issue that determines their
case comes close to a basic denial of due process.”196
Though the Eleventh Circuit seems to have carved out
occasional exceptions to its rule,197 those exceptions are
insufficient to protect litigants’ due process rights. The
exceptions are rare,198 and virtually all recent Eleventh Circuit
decisions reject new issues.199 The court has thus moved toward
a blanket rule eliminating all consideration of new issues,
thereby denying litigants their constitutional right to be heard.
In particular, criminal defendants are harmed by the
Eleventh Circuit’s rule. The due process guarantees in criminal
trials are stronger than in civil cases.200 Indeed, “there is no
question that in criminal cases the requirements of due process
outweigh the principles of waiver.”201 Criminal appellants in the
Eleventh Circuit are essentially at a due-process disadvantage.
Even though the Bordons got their day in court, dismissal of an
issue based on the barest procedural concerns “comes close to a
basic denial of due process.”202

194

Milani & Smith, supra note 190, at 268.
Id. (quoting Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 186 (1941)
(Jackson, J., concurring)). Milani and Smith discuss due process concerns in
a somewhat different context: the failure to hear arguments on the dispositive
issue because a court has raised the issue sua sponte. Id.
196
ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, MODERN APPELLATE PRACTICE 40 (1983).
197
See supra note 112, discussing instances where the Eleventh Circuit
has considered previously unraised issues for plain error.
198
In his Levy dissent, Judge Tjoflat cited only two cases in support of
his proposition that the Eleventh Circuit allowed for plain-error review of
new issues. United States v. Levy, 391 F.3d 1327, 1343-44 (11th Cir. 2004)
(Tjoflat, J., dissenting).
199
See supra Part I.
200
Martineau, supra note 4, at 1055.
201
Id.
202
MARTINEAU, supra note 196, at 40.
195
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B. Recent Changes to Rule 28(j)
Apart from the potential due process problems, the Eleventh
Circuit’s rule barring new issues to be raised in a Rule 28(j)
letter conflicts with recent changes to the rule. The previous
version of the rule “required parties to describe supplemental
authorities ‘without argument.’”203 Rule 28(j) was changed
because “[e]nforcement of the restriction has been lax” due to
difficulty distinguishing between a required statement explaining
the need for supplemental authority and “argument.”204 Public
comments supported the change to Rule 28(j), noting that the
prohibition on argument was “frequently flouted.”205 The Rules
Committee recommended changing the Rule to drop the
prohibition on argument.206 The new rule—adopted in December
2002—was designed to “permit[] parties to decide for
themselves what they wish to say about supplemental
authority.”207
While the new version of Rule 28(j) is similar to older
versions, the Rules Committee clearly intended that parties be
allowed to present arguments based on new authority. While the
Committee made no mention of intentionally disturbing the
general rule, the allowance for argument indicates intent to use
28(j) letters for advocacy. That intent, combined with the due
process concerns and the willingness of other circuits to hear
203

Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Appellate, Bankruptcy, Civil, and Criminal Procedure, at 46. See also Braley
v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504, 1510 (10th Cir. 1987) (sanctioning appellant’s
counsel in part because he “violated Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) by making
additional arguments in letters which ostensibly provided the court with
supplemental authorities. Such arguments are improper and further burden the
court and counsel.”).
204
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Appellate, Bankruptcy, Civil, and Criminal Procedure, at 46.
205
See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure
and
Form
6,
at
103-05,
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/jc0901.html.
206
Id. at 103.
207
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Appellate, Bankruptcy, Civil, and Criminal Procedure, at 46.
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new arguments in 28(j) letters, indicates that the Eleventh
Circuit erroneously dismisses new arguments based on
supplemental authority.
IV. HOW OTHER JURISDICTIONS APPROACH SUPPLEMENTAL
AUTHORITY
While the Eleventh Circuit has been able to support its
procedural rule, other circuits have presented a more flexible
approach to supplemental authority. Both the First and Sixth
Circuits have clearly articulated rules on allowing post-brief,
supplemental authority as a source of new arguments.208 Other
circuits have heard arguments based on cases decided postbrief,209 or expressed a willingness to do so had an appellant
properly filed a 28(j) letter.210 Additionally, numerous states
have interpreted their rules of appellate procedure as being
flexible enough to allow for review of post-brief supplemental
authority.211
A. The First Circuit: United States v. Cordoza-Estrada
Silvierio Cordoza-Estrada was convicted of re-entering the
United States after being deported and sentenced to 18 months in
prison and three years of supervised release.212 Cordoza-Estrada
was deported in 2001 after being convicted in New Hampshire

208

See United States v. Oliver, 397 F.3d 369, 377 n.1 (6th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Cheal, 389 F.3d 35, 45 n.10 (1st Cir. 2004).
209
See United States v. Soy, 413 F.3d 594, 615 (7th Cir. 2005).
210
Structural Indus., Inc. v. United States, 356 F.3d 1366, 1369 (Fed.
Cir. 2004).
211
See, e.g., State v. Resendis-Felix, 100 P.3d 457, 459 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2004) review granted, remanded to No. CR-05-0031-PR, 2005 WL 2414769
(Ariz. Sep. 27, 2005) remanded to No. 2 CA-CR 2003-0114-PR, 2005 WL
2787475 (Ariz. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2005); Rolling v. State, 619 So. 2d 20, 23
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Rochelle v. State, 791 S.W.2d 121, 124-25 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1990).
212
United States v. Cordoza-Estrada, 385 F.3d 56, 57 (1st Cir. 2004).
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of simple assault.213 His assault conviction in state court was
treated as an aggravated felony for the purpose of his federal
sentence for the crime of re-entering the United States.214
Cordoza-Estrada appealed the determination that his New
Hampshire conviction was an “aggravated felony” under the
meaning of the federal sentencing guidelines that mandated an
increased sentence.215 He later appealed his sentence based on
the Supreme Court’s holding in Blakely.216
Cordoza-Estrada’s Blakely appeal was filed in a 28(j)
letter.217 The court agreed to consider the Blakely argument,
saying that “since appellant’s argument depends upon a decision
that did not exist at the time of briefing, a 28(j) letter is a
perfectly appropriate avenue by which to present it—such letters
are intended to provide the court with new authority.”218 The
court eventually rejected Cordoza-Estrada’s arguments on the
merits.219
The First Circuit has also agreed to hear arguments based on
post-brief authority under the “plain error” jurisdiction available
to appellate courts.220 The court observed that “where a party is
raising a new issue in response to a potentially crucial Supreme
Court decision that issued only after briefing and oral argument
were completed,” a different analysis applies than would if the
party had waived or forfeited the issue.221 Additionally, the First
Circuit has indicated a willingness to consider arguments first
put forth in a 28(j) letter where the parties have failed to file
such letters.222
213

Id.
Id.
215
Id.
216
Id. at 59.
217
Id.
218
United States v. Cordoza-Estrada, 385 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir. 2004).
219
Id.
220
United States v. Morgan, 384 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2004).
221
Id. at 7-8.
222
United States v. Cheal, 389 F.3d 35, 45 n.10 (1st Cir. 2004) (“The
Supreme Court decided Blakely v. Washington after oral argument in this
case. Cheal has not submitted a letter of supplemental authority under Fed.
214
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B. The Sixth Circuit: United States v. Oliver
David Oliver was convicted of conspiracy to possess
methamphetamine with intent to distribute and sentenced to 180
months in prison and five years of supervised release.223 Oliver
appealed his conviction, asserting several errors in the district
court.224 He also initially appealed his sentence, saying his flight
from a drug-treatment program was improperly considered an
obstruction of justice.225 Oliver later filed a 28(j) letter citing
Blakely and asserting that the sentence imposed violated his
Sixth Amendment rights.226 He also filed a second letter seeking
relief under Booker.227
The Sixth Circuit agreed to consider Oliver’s Blakely and
Booker claims, citing the First Circuit’s rule in Cordoza-Estrada
that a 28(j) letter is the appropriate filing for relevant post-brief
authority that raises new issues.228 The court ruled that “the
steps taken by Oliver both before and after oral argument were
sufficient to raise on appeal the issue of the constitutionality of
Oliver’s sentence.”229 In a strong statement supporting the First
Circuit’s understanding of Rule 28(j), the court held that Oliver
“complied with [the] requirements of Rule 28(j)” and properly
brought the Blakely/Booker claims before the court.230 The Sixth
Circuit vacated Oliver’s sentence based on Booker and remanded
to the district court for re-sentencing.231

R. App. P. 28(j) challenging her sentence based on Blakely’s possible
application to the federal sentencing guidelines. Consequently, we do not
address the issue.”) (citations omitted).
223
United States v. Oliver, 397 F.3d 369, 374 (6th Cir. 2005).
224
Id. at 374.
225
Id.
226
Id. at 377 n.1.
227
Id.
228
Id.
229
United States v. Oliver, 397 F.3d 369, 377 n.1 (6th Cir. 2005).
230
Id.
231
Id. at 381-82.
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C. State Court Approaches to Post-Brief Authority
Numerous states have dealt with the issue of relevant
authority decided after the submission of appellate briefs. For
example, Kostia Ivan Resendis-Felix pled guilty to aggravated
robbery in Arizona.232 Resendis-Felix appealed his sentence,
saying the trial court failed to take into account mitigating
factors.233 While his appeal was pending, Resendis-Felix filed a
notice of supplemental authority arguing that his sentence should
be vacated in light of Blakely.234 The State objected to ResendisFelix’s Blakely claim, arguing that any such claim had been
waived because it had not been raised.235 Nonetheless, the
Arizona Court of Appeals held the Blakely arguments raised by
Resendis-Felix amounted to fundamental error, and as such
could be heard by the court regardless of issues of waiver.236
The court vacated Resendis-Felix’s sentence and remanded for
re-sentencing pursuant to Blakely.237
Similarly, in Florida—the site of the Bordons’ ill-fated
gambling and money-laundering operation—the state courts have
considered post-brief supplemental authority on numerous
occasions. In 1993, a Florida appeals court vacated a sentence
based on a recent Florida Supreme Court ruling raised by
appellant in a supplemental briefing.238 Likewise, a Florida
appeals court heard but rejected an argument by the State based
on supplemental authority in an appeal of final orders in a
juvenile delinquency hearing.239 Finally, the Florida Supreme
Court considered an appeal of a criminal sentence based on

232

State v. Resendis-Felix, 100 P.3d 457, 458 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
Id. at 459.
234
Id.
235
Id.
236
Id.
237
State v. Resendis-Felix, 100 P.3d 457, 460 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
Resendis-Felix’s sentence was later reinstated because he admitted to facts
that increased his sentence. Resendis-Felix, 2005 WL 2787475 at *1.
238
Rolling v. State, 619 So. 2d 20, 23 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
239
J.M.J. v. State, 742 So. 2d 261, 262 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
233
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supplemental authority—Blakely and Ring v. Arizona240—but
rejected the arguments on their merits.241
Hawaii seems to have the most expansive rule on acceptance
of post-brief new issues. The Hawaii Supreme Court considered
post-brief authority sua sponte, though the court ultimately held
that the authority (Booker) was not applicable to the case before
it.242 A dissenting opinion held that the court improperly
considered Booker and should have applied it to the instant case
only if raised by the parties in Hawaii’s equivalent of a 28(j)
letter.243
D. Split Within the Circuit: The Tenth Circuit’s Rule on
Post-Brief Supplemental Authority Mirrors That of the
Eleventh Circuit
While most jurisdictions are willing to hear arguments based
on new issues, the Eleventh Circuit’s approach is mirrored by a
divided Supreme Court,244 with greater authority to dispose of
issues, and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which has a
somewhat muddled rule concerning the consideration of new
issues, but seems to rely on the Eleventh Circuit for guidance.
The Tenth Circuit has barred new issues raised first in a 28(j)
letter but not in a party’s appellate brief while apparently
allowing new issues when presented in an appellate brief.245 The
court based its rule regarding 28(j) letters in part on Eleventh
Circuit precedent.246
240

536 U.S. 584 (2002). In Ring, the Supreme Court held that a death
sentence imposed after determinations of fact made by a trial judge and not
the jury violated the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 609.
241
Conahan v. State, 844 So. 2d 629, 642 n.9 (Fla. 2003).
242
State v. Maugaotega, 114 P.3d 905, 913-16 (Haw. 2005).
243
Id. at 916-17 (Acoba, J., dissenting).
244
See supra Part I.
245
See United States v. Levy, 391 F.3d 1327, 1346 n.16 (11th Cir.
2004) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting). A seemingly conflicting line of decisions was
explained by opining that “the court was holding only that a Rule 28(j) letter
is not a proper venue for raising a new argument.” Id. (emphasis in original).
246
United States v. Rosales, 112 F. App’x 685, 692 (10th Cir. 2004).
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In United States v. Rosales, the Tenth Circuit declined to
consider appellant’s arguments based on Blakely, rejecting a
28(j) letter raising Sixth Amendment claims.247 The court
reached a similar conclusion in United States v. Horn,248
rejecting a 28(j) letter asserting a Blakely claim because, “prior
to the letter, Mr. Horn did not challenge the district court’s
ability to determine the facts resulting in his sentencing
calculation . . . . In that Mr. Horn did not seek permission to
file a brief properly raising the Blakely issue, we decline to
consider the matter further.”249 Similarly, in United States v.
Taing,250 the Tenth Circuit rejected a Booker argument as
waived.251
The Tenth Circuit’s rejection of new issues seems to be
based on the filing in which they are presented. For example, in
United States v. Badilla,252 the court reviewed a Blakely claim
that was presented in a Motion for Post-Submission
Consideration.253 The court reviewed for plain error but found
that any error stemming from a failure to consider Badilla’s
claims that his sentence was enhanced by factual issues not
determined by a jury did not “seriously affect[] the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.”254
247

Id.
113 F. App’x 355 (10th Cir. 2004).
249
Id. at 358.
250
135 F. App’x 177 (10th Cir. 2005).
251
Id. at 181.
252
383 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 2004).
253
Id. at 1142 n.2.
254
Id. The Tenth Circuit reviewed its decision in Badilla upon remand
from the Supreme Court. See Badilla v. United States, 543 U.S. 1098 (2005).
On remand, the court of appeals reinstated all portions of its prior opinion
except note 2, finding that because Badilla
failed to establish that his substantial rights were affected by the
district court’s application of the obstruction of justice
enhancement, there [was] no need to proceed on to the fourth
prong of the plain error analysis [of whether the error seriously
affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings].
United States v. Badilla, 419 F.3d 1128, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005).
248
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Similarly, in United States v. Westover, the Tenth Circuit
similarly granted a defendant’s motion to supplement his
appellate brief to raise a Blakely claim.255 The court rejected a
number of challenges to Westover’s conviction, but retained
jurisdiction to address Blakely issues raised in a supplemental
brief.256 Eleventh Circuit Judge Tjoflat, discussing the apparent
conflict between the Tenth Circuit’s rulings in cases such as
Horn, Taing and Rosales, and its willingness to allow new issues
in Badilla and Westover, noted:
the court was only holding that a Rule 28(j) letter is
not a proper vehicle for raising a new argument—i.e.,
Rule 28(j) letters should be used only to identify new
authority relating to arguments already raised—and
that the defendant waived his right to raise a Blakely
claim by not properly seeking permission to file a
supplemental brief.257
The Tenth Circuit thus leaves the door open—if only
slightly—for new issues in a way that the Eleventh Circuit does
not. However, the split among the circuits calls for a change to
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to bring all circuits in
line with notions of fairness to appellate litigants.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION: RULE 28(J)(2)
While the Eleventh Circuit’s rule on hearing new issues
based on post-brief authority is supported by the Tenth Circuit’s
less stringent rule, the Eleventh Circuit’s approach conflicts with
the law in other federal jurisdictions. This inconsistency results
in unpredictable outcomes for litigants and deprives parties
appearing before the Eleventh Circuit of their right to be heard.
In order to standardize how federal appeals courts deal with new
issues that derive from supplemental authority, an addition to the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure is necessary.
255

United States v. Westover, 107 F. App’x 840, 847 (10th Cir. 2004).
Id.
257
United States v. Levy, 391 F.3d 1327, 1346 n.16 (11th Cir. 2004)
(Tjoflat, J., dissenting).
256
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Appellate parties seeking to introduce new issues based on
recent authority rely now on Rule 28(j) of the Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure. That rule reads:
If pertinent and significant authorities come to a
party’s attention after the party’s brief has been
filed—or after oral argument but before decision—a
party may promptly advise the circuit clerk by letter,
with a copy to all other parties, setting forth the
citations. The letter must state the reasons for the
supplemental citations, referring either to the page of
the brief or to a point argued orally. The body of the
letter must not exceed 350 words. Any response must
be made promptly and must be similarly limited.258
The command that a 28(j) letter refer to the relevant “page
of the brief or to a point argued orally” when declaring why the
supplemental authority is relevant has been citied as justification
for declining to hear new issues in supplementary filings.259
Thus, by tying consideration of new authority to issues
previously raised, Rule 28(j) could be said to limit how a filing
under the rule can bring to the court’s attention new law that
will be dispositive.260 The solution is a new subsection to Rule
28(j) which will provide a limited vehicle for addressing new
issues based on recently issued controlling authority.
The current Rule 28(j) should become subparagraph (1) of
the Rule. A new addition to the rule, Rule 28(j)(2), should read:
If significant authorities representing a change in
existing law come to a party’s attention after the
party’s brief has been filed—or after oral argument
but before decision—a party should promptly advise

258

FED. R. APP. P. 28(j).
See supra Part III.
260
See United States v. Smith, 416 F.3d 1350, 1352 n.1 (11th Cir.
2005) (holding that allowing a Rule 28(j) letter to raise a new issue would
circumvent the requirements of Rule 28(a)(5); United States v. Levy, 416
F.3d 1273, 1276 (11th Cir. 2005) (“To allow a new issue to be raised in a
petition for rehearing circumvents Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
28(a)(5).”).
259
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the circuit clerk by letter, with a copy to all other
parties, setting forth the citations. The letter must
state the significance of the new authority and briefly
list any new issues raised by such authority. The
body of the letter must not exceed 350 words. Any
response must be made promptly and must be
similarly limited.
The proposed Rule 28(j)(2) guarantees at least some review
of any new law that is handed down while an appeal is pending,
but still allows a court of appeals to set procedural rules. By
requiring that new issues raised in a 28(j)(2) letter be raised by
supplemental authority, the new subparagraph would not serve
as a last chance for appellate counsel to raise issues previously
waived, forfeited or abandoned. Instead, Rule 28(j)(2) would
allow for intervening case law to raise a new, pertinent and
possibly dispositive issue in keeping with the due process rights
of defendants and appellants.
This addition to Rule 28(j) protects the interests of adverse
appellate parties. The proposed rule mirrors the existing
language of Rule 28(j), which allows for a response that “must
be made promptly and must be similarly limited.”261 Allowing
an adverse appellate party to argue new authority within the
same limitation preserves that party’s due process rights.
Additionally, a party which finds itself on the wrong side of
newly decided authority has the option to petition for a rehearing by the full panel of a court of appeals.262 Therefore,
prejudice to adverse parties will not be a concern if Rule 28(j) is
modified.
A potential drawback to Rule 28(j)(2) is the possibility of
overburdening courts with new issues that need to be decided
very late in the appellate process—including, possibly, after a
panel has heard and discussed the case. While such concerns are
valid, the Rule would protect the judicial system by limiting the
parties to 350 words. The limitation—which is just as strict as
that which appears in the current Rule 28(j)—gives the party
261
262

Limited, that is, to 350 words.
See FED. R. APP. P. 40.
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seeking review of new authority a chance to present relevant
case law without requiring the court to delve into an entirely
new brief. Of course, the court retains the option of ordering
supplemental briefing on any issue where additional filings
would be helpful.
It is possible that courts might be burdened by the raising of
numerous or frivolous issues in 28(j)(2) letters. However, the
concern is a minor one, at worst. Ironically, the Eleventh
Circuit’s defense of its rule on hearing new issues demonstrates
why frivolous 28(j)(2) claims will be rare. As the court pointed
out in Levy, attorneys already have an incentive to raise all
possible claims at various stages of the trial and appellate
process—to preserve issues for de novo review.263 Attorneys
have refrained from doing so, likely because they recognize the
futility of raising long-shot issues and the possibility of Rule 11
sanctions for raising frivolous claims. It is unlikely that
attorneys will suddenly become emboldened by a last chance to
raise an issue, especially since the proposed language of Rule
28(j)(2) requires that any supplemental authority cited in a filing
under this Rule “represent . . . a change in existing law.” This
limiting clause, along with the 350-word limit, will reduce any
burden on appellate courts while still affording appellants the
opportunity to raise new case law that could prove dispositive.
CONCLUSION
The general rule against hearing previously unraised issues
on appeal is a sound principle of appellate procedure that does
much to safeguard the interests of all parties. However, like
virtually every other rule, the general rule has sound exceptions,
including an intervening change in the law. The Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, to the dismay of several of its judges, has
ignored this exception to the general rule when considering new
issues raised in supplemental filings. It is the most restrictive of
all circuits that have dealt with this issue in recent years, and is
the only circuit with a blanket rule rejecting new issues raised
263

United States v. Levy, 391 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 2004).
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by supplemental authority. The Eleventh Circuit’s approach is
unfair to litigants and criminal defendants. The court’s ban on
new issues raised in supplemental authority has due process
implications and runs contrary to the intent of recent changes to
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28.
An addition to Rule 28(j) would bring the Eleventh Circuit in
line with other courts of appeal. If the Rule were modified to
allow appellate parties to raise supplemental authority
“representing a change in existing law,” circuit courts would be
required to give some sort of review to new issues raised in
28(j) letters. The language of the proposed Rule 28(j)(2) will
sufficiently limit the burden on appellate courts, and will protect
adverse parties by allowing a chance for reply. This change to
Rule 28(j) will ensure justice for the Bordons, Raphael Levy and
all defendants and litigants who see a dispositive issue decided
just a little too late.

